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Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), Petitioner and Appellant 
Amber Taylor ("Mother") submits the following appellate brief. 
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Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-
103(2)(j), as this case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-2(j). 
Issues Presented For Review 
1. Whether the district court erred when it transferred custody of the parties' 
minor children without making a determination that such transfer was in the children's best 
interests. This issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. SeeWrightv. Wright, 941 P. 2d 646, 
652 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, f 21, 989 P.2d 491. 
2. Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied Mother's motion 
for new trial. Denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See 
Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, | 21. 
Determinative Statutory Provisions 
Statutes that may be determinative of this appeal include Utah Code section 30-3-
10(l)(a) and section 30-3-10.4. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-10(l)(a), 30-3-10.4. 
Statement of the Case 
The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce in 2005. (SeeR.181; a copy of the 
Decree is attached hereto as Addendum A-l). The parties have two minor children, to wit, 
Kyle J. Elison (born 11/10/01) and Kaylee A. Elison (born 9/13/03). Pursuant to the Decree 
of Divorce, the parties were awarded joint legal custody, and Mother was designated as the 
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primary physical custodian. (See id.) The Decree of Divorce contained a relocation 
provision which states, et alia, that if Mother moves from the state of Utah, other than to Las 
Vegas, Nevada, the children should remain in Utah with respondent, who would then be 
designated as the primary physical custodian. (See id, | 7). 
At the time of the Decree of Divorce, both parties resided in Iron County, Utah. 
Subsequent to that time, Respondent and Appellee Clinton Elison ("Father") moved to Salt 
Lake County and Mother moved to Washington County. In February 2009, Mother filed a 
petition to modify the divorce decree, as she sought to relocate to Arizona in order to take 
employment there. In May 2009, Father filed a motion for temporary orders and objected to 
Mother's relocation with the children. Mother also filed a motion for temporary orders in 
May 2009. (See R.222, 238.) 
The district court set a hearing on the motions for temporary orders on July 8, 2009. 
On that date, the Court heard evidence and argument. At the conclusion of that hearing, the 
district court ordered that custody of the children should be transferred from Mother to 
Father. (See Hearing Transcript, R.381.) No specific provisions were made for interstate 
visitation. This decision was based solely on the relocation provision contained in the Decree 
ofDivorce. (See id.,pp. 121-30.) Mother subsequently filed a motion to set aside this order 
on the basis that the district court had not determined that this drastic change in custody was 
in the best interests of the children. (See R.297.) This motion was denied summarily. (See 
R.328.) 
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Mother now appeals the order of the district court transferring custody of the minor 
children as well as the order that denied Mother's motion for new trial. 
Statement of Facts 
1. The parties were divorced on May 19, 2005, at which time they were awarded 
joint legal custody of their two minor children, with Mother designated as the primary 
physical custodian. See Decree of Divorce (R. 181). 
2. The Decree of Divorce contained a relocation provision that provided that if 
Mother moved from the State of Utah the children should remain in Utah with Father as the 
primary physical custodian. Both parties were residents of Iron County, Utah, when the 
Decree was entered. See id. 
3. In 2006 Mother moved from Iron County to Washington County, Utah. Father 
also moved from Iron County to Salt Lake County, Utah. {See R.238) 
4. On February 19, 2009, Mother filed a petition to modify the Decree to permit 
her to relocate with the children to Arizona and be granted sole legal custody. {See R.201.) 
On April 9, 2009, Mother notified Father, in writing, of her intent to move to Arizona. 
Mother subsequently moved to Flagstaff, Arizona in May 2009. {See R. 238) 
5. On May 14, 2009 Father filed his Motion for Temporary Order and objected 
to Mother's relocation. Mother filed her Motion for Temporary Orders the following day. 
(SeeR.222.). 
6. A hearing was held on July 8, 2009, at which time the district court transferred 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the primary care of the children from Mother to Father. This determination was based solely 
on the 2005 provision in the Decree that if Mother moved, Father would become the primary 
physical custodian. The district court did not make any determination regarding the best 
interests of the children when it ordered this change in custody. Nor did the district court 
consider the facts and circumstances surrounding both parties' moves away from southern 
Utah over the preceding 4 years. This determination was made during the course of oral 
argument (see Hearing Transcript, R.381, pp. 121-30), and was not finalized until March 
2010. (See order entered March 22, 2010, R.346.) 
7. On January 8, 2010, Mother filed a Motion to Set Aside, Alter or Amend the 
district court's ruling, and on January 22, 2010, Mother filed an Emergency Petition to 
Modify Decree, Permit Relocation and Establish Inter-State Parenting Time. (See R297, 
307.) Each of these motions were summarily denied by the district court on January 27, 
2010. (SeeR.328.) 
Summary of Arguments 
The district court erred when it changed custody of the parties minor children in this 
case without first making a determination that this change was in the children's best interests. 
The district court also abused its discretion when it denied Mother's motion for new 
trial, which motion was based, in part, on the argument that the district court had to first 
make factual findings that a change in custody is in the children's best interests. 
7 
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Argument 
The District Court Abused its Discretion When it Transferred Custody of the 
Parties' Minor Children Without Making a Determination the Transfer Was in 
the Best Interests of the Children. 
Utah case law requires trial courts to make the following two findings of fact before 
modifying a child custody order: "[1] there has been a material change in the circumstances 
upon which the earlier order was based, and [2] a change in custody is in the best interests 
of the child." Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 650 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also Soltanieh 
v. King, 826 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah.Ct.App.1992)); Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah 
1982). The district court in this case failed to make either finding. Of particular concern, 
the district court made no findings regarding the children's best interests. Accordingly, its 
order transferring custody of the children should be reversed and this case remanded for 
appropriate proceedings to determine the best interests of the children. 
"[SJtrong public policy reasons underlie the two-step requirement of these child 
custody cases. This procedure allows courts to monitor the best interests of children and 
especially to provide stability to children by protecting them from "ping-pong" custody 
awards." Wright, 941 P.2d at 650; see also Kramer v. Kramer, 73 8 P.2d 624, 626, 627 (Utah 
1987) ("[SJtable custody arrangements are of critical importance to the child's proper 
development. The two-part Hogge test is founded upon that premise.... 'The rationale is that 
custody placements, once made, should be as stable as possible unless the factual basis for 
them has completely changed.'"); Hogge, 649 P.2d at 54 (same); Cummings v. Cummings, 
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821 P.2d 472,475 (Utah. Ct. App. 1991) (same); Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 839 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991) (same); Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh, 745 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1987) ("the 
existing-placement presumption is based on the assumption that it will normally serve the 
best interests of the child."). 
"The important public policy to have courts ensure that a child's best interests will be 
met before transferring custody of the child applies in all cases involving the change in a 
child's custody, not just in cases involving disputes between divorced parents that are decided 
upon the merits." Wright, 941 P.2d at 651. "As such, in consideration of the strong public 
policy to safeguard the interests of children, we hold that before a trial court may enter a 
judgment by default that transfers custody of a child, the trial court must take evidence and 
then make findings that a substantial change of circumstances has occurred and that 
transferring custody of the child is in the child's best interests." Id. at 652. This is not only 
a mandate by Utah courts, but by the legislature as well. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(l)(a) 
(stating that "any" determination regarding the form of custody "shall" include consideration 
of the childrens' best interests); § 30-3-10.4 (best interests determination must be made 
before modification of custody order). 
In Wright, the district court failed to make the two required findings set forth above 
before modifying an existing custody order. As a result, this Court concluded that "the trial 
court abused its discretion by modifying the child custody order because it failed to first take 
evidence and make the necessary findings," Wright, 941 P.2d at 652, vacated the district 
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court's judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. See id. 
The same error occurred in this case. The district court did not make a determination 
regarding the children's best interests before modifying the existing custody order. Instead, 
the district court simply noted that a best interests determination had been made at the time 
the Decree was entered into some four years earlier, and treated this case as if it were a basic 
contract matter: 
The court, by the Decree, has already ordered that custody 
would change if the Petitioner moved outside of Utah or the Las 
Vegas area. 
The court already determined that it would be in the best 
interests of the children for that to be the order and primarily 
because the parties stipulated to it; so that is what the parties' 
rights are at this point in time. 
March 23, 2010 Order, p. 3 (R.346, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A-2). 
These findings are further explained by the district court in its oral ruling: 
[T]he decree specifically provided that a change in custody would occur 
if one of the parties moved, particularly in this instance and in this sentence, 
if petitioner moves from the State of Utah.... 
Petitioner's testimony indicated, as one would expect, that she 
understood that provision and what the consequences of her move would be. 
Consequently, as a matter of law, a change of custody from the petitioner to 
the respondent is not a modification of the decree. A temporary order is not 
required. The Court has already ordered that custody would change. Upon the 
stipulation of the party the Court -- the parties, the Court made that order. The 
Court already determined that it would be in the best interests of the children 
for that to be the order and primarily because the parties stipulated to it. So 
that's what the parties' rights are at this point in time. 
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9/8/09 Hearing Transcript (R.381), p. 125, lines 19-23; p.126, lines 1-13. The district court 
continued: 
But in any event, I don't find any basis for the Court to grant temporary 
orders which are at variance with the existing decree. And so the petitioner's 
motion for temporary orders is denied. The Court is granting the respondent's 
motion for temporary orders, but not as such. Because of the dispute between 
the parties, because of the nature of the dispute, because of the need for this 
hearing to determine the children's location, and particularly to determine 
which parent will have primary custody, I find it necessary to make this order: 
First of all, that the petitioner's move from the State of Utah triggered the 
change of custody. Pursuant to paragraph 7, the respondent is designated the 
primary custodian of the children. And the Court will order that that decree 
and that portion of the decree remain effective. Number 2, the petitioner's 
parent time is specified in paragraph 7. In sentences 4 and 5, the first sentence, 
first of those, number 4, provides certain things if the respondent were to move 
from the State of Utah. And paragraph — or sentence 5 says, petitioner shall 
have the same parent time schedule if she is one that moves. I don't see any 
need for the Court to order anything otherwise. The parties contemplated this, 
the parties planned for it, the parties asked the Court to order, and that's the 
former order of the Court and it's the current order of the Court.... 
And again, I emphasize that this order is made pursuant to the decree 
itself and in enforcement of the decree, and as such, it is not a temporary order. 
Whether this changes in future will depend on the outcome of the petitioner's 
petition to modify. But in the meantime, the Court intends to enforce the terms 
of the decree itself and — and with that and with the guidance of Rule 106, 
make this order regarding change of custody. 
Id., p. 128, line 25; p. 129, 1-24; 130, lines 18-25 
There is no question that the district court failed to consider whether the change in 
custody it was ordering was in the best interests of the children at the time the decision was 
made. Instead, the district court relied solely on a stipulation of the parties made years earlier 
pursuant to a default divorce decree. This ruling failed to comply with Utah law and 
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constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Wright, 941 P.2d at 651-52; see also Diener v. 
Diener, 2004 UT App 314, ^ 5, 98 P.3d 1178 ("when presented with a petition to modify a 
child support order, the trial court may not simply rely upon a prior stipulation entered into 
by the parties and accepted by the court"); Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407,410 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) ("Because an unadjudicated custody decree based on default or stipulation is not based 
on an objective, impartial determination of the best interests of the child, it may not serve the 
child's best interests."). As a consequence, the district court's order should be vacated and 
this case remanded for appropriate proceedings to determine the best interests of the children. 
See Wright, 941 P.2d at 652.1 
CONCLUSION 
The district court transferred custody of the parties' minor children without first 
considering or making factual determinations regarding whether that transfer is in the 
children's best interests. This constitutes an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, Mother 
requests that this Court reverse the district court and remand so that this determination can 
be made. 
!The district court's transfer of custody, and the district court's refusal to set aside the 
order effectuating this transfer, are tainted by the same error - an abuse of discretion. 
Accordingly, each order is subject to reversal for the very same reasons - the district court failed 
to consider the best interests of the children. 
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DATED this day of September, 2010. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
David S. Dolowitz 
Bradley M. Strassberg 
Attorneys for Petitioner and Appellant 
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